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Abstract
Neural networks are highly sensitive to adversarial examples, which cause large1
output deviations with only small input perturbations. However, little is known2
quantitatively about the distribution and prevalence of such adversarial examples.3
To address this issue, we propose a rigorous search method that provably finds the4
smallest possible adversarial example. The key benefit of our method is that it5
gives precise quantitative insight into the distribution of adversarial examples, and6
guarantees the absence of adversarial examples if they are not found. The primary7
idea is to consider the nonlinearity exhibited by the network in a small region of the8
input space, and search exhaustively for adversarial examples in that region. We9
show that the frequency of adversarial examples and robustness of neural networks10
is up to twice as large as reported in previous works that use empirical adversarial11
attacks. In addition, we provide an approach to approximate the nonlinear behavior12
of neural networks, that makes our search method computationally feasible.13
Neural networks are not robust: Szegedy et al. [2013] first showed that neural networks can be made14
to incorrectly classify correctly labeled inputs by perturbing the input by a small amount. Hence,15
there are no safety and security guarantees when applying neural networks in real-world applications16
(e.g. autonomous vehicles). A key issue is to compute objective measures for network robustness, e.g.17
how many adversarial examples arise (frequency) and the size of (the smallest) adversarial example18
(severity). However, this is challenging, as state-of-the-art networks can be large and highly nonlinear.19
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Figure 2: Adversarial examples that switch
prediction from 4 to 6. Our method consis-
tently finds smaller adversarial perturbations
than baselines. Blue: original; red: ∆x.
To address this issue, we propose a rigorous search20
method to construct adversarial examples for a class21
of neural networks: fully-connected networks with22
ReLU activations. Our method combines three in-23
sights: 1) ReLU neural networks can be viewed as a24
collection of logical clauses (as proposed in Bastani25
et al. [2016]). 2) By considering the behavior of net-26
work activations in regions around an input, finding27
an adversarial example can be reduced to solving a28
large system of independent linear programs. 3) We29
propose an approximation to the nonlinear behavior30
of network activations, as constructing the set of31
feasible piecewise linear regions for the hierarchy32
of network layers can be prohibitively expensive.33
Combining these, we obtain a tractable approach to34
construct adversarial examples.35
The key benefits of our approach are two-fold: 1) our method provably finds the smallest adversarial36
example for any specified output change (or guarantees the absence of such adversarial examples)37
and hence 2) it gives unbiased quantitative measures of the robustness of the neural network.38
Several adversarial attacks have previously been proposed: Goodfellow et al. [2014], Carlini and39
Wagner [2016] use input space gradients, while Bastani et al. [2016] use a constraint programming40
based approach, similar to us. However, these methods do not provide theoretical guarantees on41
completeness nor optimality. [Katz et al., 2017, Ehlers, 2017, Huang et al., 2017] use formal methods42
to analyze the network in its entirety, but these do not scale well for larger networks. Instead, our43
method both guarantees minimality of the adversarial example and scales better to large networks.44
In this work, we present a tractable approach to find adversarial examples and analyze local network45
robustness via a model reduction to constraints in linear arithmetic. Our contributions are as follows:46
• We propose an adversarial attack that uses a reduction of neural networks into logical clauses47
and an iterative search over feasible network activations to find adversarial examples.48
• We make this search tractable via approximation bounds on the set of feasible activations.49
• We show that our method provably finds the minimal adversarial example for an input x or50
guarantees its absence within its neighborhood.51
• We validate our method by showing that ReLU neural networks can be attacked with52
examples with a smaller magnitude, and up to twice as frequently as previously reported.53
1 Finding Adversarial Examples via Satisfiability Problems54
Our goal is to find the minimal adversarial perturbation ∆x ∈ Rd for a given neural network classifier55
f(x) that changes f ’s output to a target class j:56
∆x∗ = argmin
∆x
{‖∆x‖p | f(x) = i, f(x+ ∆x) = j, i 6= j}. (1)
Bastani et al. [2016] quantified the distribution of such examples using the point-wise robustness57
ρ(x, f, j), the smallest ball around x that does not contain adversarial examples:58
ρ(x, f, j) = inf{ | ∃∆x : f(x+ ∆x) = j, ‖∆x‖p ≤ }. (2)
where p = 1, 2,∞ has been considered in literature. In our work we use p = 1, but the principles59
hold for the other norms as well. Given a distribution D from which data points are sampled, based60
on ρ, the adversarial frequency φ and severity µ are the prevalence and average robustness:61
φ(f, δ, j) = Px∼D(ρ(x, f, j) ≤ δ), µ(f, δ, j) = Ex∼D(ρ(x, f, j)|ρ(x, f, j) ≤ δ) (3)
ReLU networks as logic constraints Hereafter, we will consider fully-connected networks with62
ReLU activations. We follow Bastani et al. [2016] and describe a ReLU network as a logic formula63
in linear arithmetic. Here, each ReLU node y corresponds to a logical disjunction:64
y = max(0, wTx)⇔ (y = 0 ∧ wTx ≤ 0) ∨ (y = wTx ∧ y > 0), (4)
where each clause represents a linear region (polytope) of its input space. A change in the input x can65
cause a switch in activation: the active clause can change from wTx > 0 to wTx ≤ 0, or vice versa.66
Similarly, a network with m ReLU nodes across all layers can be represented as a single clause with67
m disjunctions, whose 2m combinations of node activations each represent a linear region for the68
network. Finding an adversarial example then corresponds to finding an x′ that satisfies this m-node69
clause and activates a desired target node in the output layer.70
An iterative approach would 1) sweep through the network sequentially node-by-node, 2) check71
what combination of node activation states can be attained for the network and 3) search over these72
combinations for the minimal adversarial example. However, this is computationally expensive73
and the sequential nature of the search prohibits parallelization. A naive parallelized search would74
consider 2m combinations of activation patterns and is prohibitively expensive.75
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Algorithm 1 Minimal Adversarial Example Search
Input: Neural Network f with L layers, perturbation radius , target-class j.
1: for layer l ∈ L layers do
2: GetInputRegions: Construct constraints Cl(xl) using Lemma 2 that bound the inputs {xl}.
3: GetSwitchingNodes: Collect nodes in layer l that switch activation (equation 4).
4: end for
5: for layer l ∈ L layers do
6: CheckAct: Given Cl(xl), check feasible activation states for switching nodes in layer l.
7: GetFeasibleRegions: Get constraints S˜l(xl) for feasible linear-regions under Cl(xl).
8: end for
9: Construct combinations (P1, P2, . . . , Pt) of
{
S˜l
}
.
10: Search {Pi} for minimal adversarial input perturbation ∆x that changes output to target class j.
Searching for provably minimal adversarial examples We now propose a tractable search algo-76
rithm (outlined in Algorithm 1) to find minimal adversarial examples in a candidate set of perturbations77
B(x, ) = {x′|‖x′ − x‖ ≤ } around an input x. The main idea is to use a parallelized approach78
and limit the number of activations to search over. Given a set of inputs Cl(xl) for layer l, we79
compute a convex-relaxation Cl+1(xl+1) of the image of Cl(xl) through the layer {ReLU(xl)}.80
These relaxations are then used to parallelize.81
More specifically, our approach has the following key steps. First, we find the nodes for each layer82
that can switch activation state (GetSwitchingNodes), on a layer-by-layer basis. For the first ReLU83
layer y = max(0,Wx + u), we define the constraint C(x) := ‖∆x‖ ≤ . To check if a node yi84
switches, we check whether both the constraints WTi x+ ui > 0 ∧C(x) and WTi x+ ui ≤ 0 ∧C(x)85
have satisfying assignments. If both are satisfiable, then the node can potentially switch activation for86
some perturbation.87
Then, for the next layer, the constraint C(y)(GetInputRegions) is determined by bounding ∆y88
using a relaxation ‖∆y − A∆x‖ ≤ ‖∆A¯‖ (Lemma 2) and ‖∆x‖ ≤ . We then use C(y) to find89
the switching nodes, and repeat this layer-wise. Next, in a layer-wise manner, we compute feasible90
combinations slswitch of node activations for the nodes that can switch in each layer (CheckAct).91
Such combinations determine a linear region S˜l for the layer output, which can be represented as92
slswitch ∧ y = Ax+ b (GetFeasibleRegions).93
Finally, we construct linear regions Pi by combining regions defined in {S˜l} across layers and search94
for the smallest adversarial example δi within Pi. Since we have searched over all the linear-regions95
of the network that can be activated by an input in B(x, ), we have:96
Lemma 1. If ∆x∗ = min{∆xi : i = 1, 2, . . . , t} ≤ , then ∆xi is the globally minimal adversarial97
example for the targeted attack. Otherwise, there exists no adversarial examples in B(x, ).98
Parallelization This approach can be parallelized at two levels: 1) Given a set of inputs for a layer99
l, the set of switching nodes for a layer can be determined in parallel across nodes. 2) After we have100
computed the over-approximation of the image of B(x, ) at each layer, we can compute the possible101
activation patterns for each of the layers in parallel.102
Approximating perturbations In order to improve search efficiency, in Algorithm 1 we consider103
a relaxation of the network’s nonlinear behavior over the input region B(x, ). To do so, we derive an104
upper bound on the output perturbation ∆y given a set of perturbed inputs x′ = x+ ∆x for a single105
ReLU layer y = max(0,Wx+ u):106
Lemma 2. Consider a ReLU layer y = max(0,Wx+ u) whose local linear behavior at a given x107
can be represented as y = Ax+ b. For any input perturbation ‖∆x‖ ≤ , ∆y satisfies108
‖∆y −A∆x‖ ≤ ‖∆A¯‖. (5)
where the rows of ∆A¯ are the weights for the nodes that can switch for a perturbation ‖∆x‖ ≤ .109
Proof. Given x′ = x+ ∆x, the ReLU output changes as:110
y + ∆y = max(0,W (x+ ∆x) + u) = (A+ ∆A)x+ (b+ ∆b), (6)
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Method (δ = 5) Frequency ρ
Baseline 26.85%
Our approach 36.55%
(a) Frequency ρ in %.
Metric (δ = 20) Method / Target class 5 6
Severity µ Baseline 12.16 17.52
Severity µ Ours 8.35 13.82
(b) Severity µ in net pixel change.
Target class 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Baseline (δ = 5) 1.8 3.4 6.0 13.4 2.9 17.6 2.4 9.5 7.2 11.5
Our approach (δ = 5) 2.2 3.9 9.6 18.0 5.1 23.8 6.6 14.8 11.9 15.7
Baseline (δ = 10) 7.9 7.7 8.6 47.0 10.1 42.5 11.5 22.6 38.2 23.9
Our approach (δ = 10) 16.8 11.1 60.0 63.2 18.5 62.8 27.3 40.0 56.4 48.8
(c) Frequency ρ in %.
Figure 3: a) Frequency for untargeted attacks. b) Severity and
robustness for targeted attacks. c) Frequency for targeted attacks.
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Figure 5: Adversarial frequency
for various thresholds δ.
where ∆A,∆b capture the nonlinear behavior of the activation function. Consider a node yi that can111
be made to switch with some such perturbation ∆x. There exists some 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1, such that112
(Ai + ∆Ai)(x+ αi∆x) + (bi + ∆bi) = 0 = Ai(x+ αi∆x) + bi, (7)
Combining the relations above, we get113
∆yi = (A+ (1− αi)∆Ai)∆xi = (A+ Ψi∆A¯i)∆xi. (8)
For non-switching nodes, we have ∆yi = Ai∆x+ ∆bi. Note that for the ReLU activation ∆Ai =114
±Wi. Hence, for any given perturbation ∆x, we have (1− αi)∆Ai∆xi = Ψi∆A¯i∆xi, with Ψi =115
±(1−αi) for switching nodes and Ψi = 1−αi = 0 for nodes that do not switch. Equivalently, we can116
write ∆y −A∆x = Ψ∆A¯∆x, where Ψ is a diagonal matrix with Ψi as its ith diagonal entry. Since117
‖Ψ‖p ≤ 1 for p = 1, 2,∞, equation (8) reduces to ‖∆y −A∆x‖ ≤ ‖∆A¯‖ · ‖∆x‖ ≤ ‖∆A¯‖.118
We also enforce y + ∆y ≥ 0. Here, we considered a convex-relaxation of the set of feasible119
perturbations ∆A. Note that Lemma 2 can be applied iteratively across layers and is tighter than the120
bound used in Szegedy et al. [2013], which used the operator norm of W i.e ‖∆y‖ ≤ ‖W‖ · ‖∆x‖.121
2 Experiments122
We trained a 3-layer network with 60-30-10 hidden units to an accuracy of 97% on MNIST [LeCun123
and Cortes, 2010]. For 300 randomly sampled examples, we compute the adversarial frequency for124
targeted and untargeted attacks, and severity and robustness for targeted attacks. We use the l1-norm125
to measure distances: changing one pixel from black to white corresponds to an l1-norm of 1. In our126
experiments, we use the l1-ball B(x,  = 5.0) around each sample x to find the minimal adversarial127
example and compare all results to Bastani et al. [2016], which is a recent state-of-the-art approach to128
measuring robustness.129
We find that on all metrics, our method outperforms the baseline. First, our method achieves130
significantly higher frequencies for both targeted (Table 3c) and untargeted (Table 3a) attacks. Here,131
our method includes linear-regions feasible with  = 5, but we compare frequencies against baseline132
for examples with threshold ∆x ≤ δ = 5, 10. For the  < δ = 10.0 case, our method still succeeds133
more frequently even though we consider fewer candidate perturbations than strictly allowed for. For134
this case, the guarantees regarding unbiasedness of the measurements do not hold.135
This trend is consistent as δ changes: Figure 5 shows our method achieves higher adversarial136
frequency for all δ, for two representative target classes; we see a similar trend in Tables 3b and 3c.137
Moreover, our method finds smaller adversarial examples: the severity (see Table 3b) is significantly138
smaller. Hence, network is significantly less robust than estimated by baselines (see Table 3b). Note139
that, for fair comparison, we compute severity only with those examples where the baseline attack140
succeeds with δ < 20.0.141
Figure 2 shows a representative instance where our attack finds a smaller adversarial perturbation142
than the baseline. We see that the perturbation found is different in nature from the baseline.143
3 Future work144
The constraints corresponding to a linear region and the output being assigned a specific label145
represent a decision boundary for the network. This could allow us to compute population statistics,146
4
such as the local density of adversarial samples. To scale to large networks, efficient algorithms to147
construct interpolants in linear-arithmetic[Albarghouthi and McMillan, 2013, Lynch and Tang, 2008]148
can be used to approximate the boundaries. Moreover, our approach could aid the design of robust149
networks and analysis of defenses against adversarial attack.150
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